

# INTERNATIONAL WEEKLY

№06 01.04.2024-15.04.2024

## Topics:

- Ukraine – European Union
- Foreign and Defense Policy of Ukraine
- The course of the Russian-Ukrainian war

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- *THEME ANALYSIS: Whether to help close the Ukrainian sky?*



*Photo: American  
Forces Information  
Service*

The European Commission has adopted a proposal for an implementing decision of the EU Council that welcomes the Ukraine Facility plan, a comprehensive strategy for reforms and investment in Ukraine for the next four years, the European Commission website reported on 15 April.

"Funding under the Facility will help Ukraine to support the work of the administration, pay salaries and pensions, provide essential public services, and support recovery and reconstruction while it continues to defend itself against Russian aggression," the statement said.<sup>1</sup>

It was noted that financial assistance will be provided on condition that Ukraine continues to support and implement effective democratic mechanisms.

"The Ukrainian Reform and Investment Strategy offers a solid basis for rebuilding a more modern and prosperous Ukraine on its path to the EU... With today's proposal, we are once again demonstrating that Europe will be with Ukraine for as long as it takes and that we are ready to provide the necessary financial support," said European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

The Ukrainian plan identifies 69 reforms and 10 investments, broken down into 146 qualitative and quantitative indicators. The reforms proposed under the Ukrainian plan cover 15 areas, including energy, agriculture, transport, green and digital transition, human capital, as well as state-owned enterprises, business environment, public finance, and decentralisation.

In total, the project has a budget of €50 billion for 2024-2027 in February. These funds will

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<sup>1</sup> Єврокомісія схвалила український план Ukraine Facility на 50 мільярдів євро допомоги. 15.04.2024. <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-dopomoha-ukrayini-yevrokomisiya/32906500.html>

be used to support the livelihoods, restore the Ukrainian state and carry out reforms on the path to EU membership.

In addition, the EU continues to look for ways to provide military support to Ukraine. Thus, the European Parliament accepted Guy Verhofstadt's proposal to postpone the vote on the EU Council funding to the next plenary session and demanded that Ukraine immediately receive air defence systems, in particular, Patriot. In his speech, Guy Verhofstadt expressed his disappointment with the situation in Ukraine and criticised the EU Council for its insufficient response to Russia's aggression.

"I am very concerned about what is happening in Ukraine. Over the past 20 days, we have seen numerous attacks by Russian forces on civilian towns, hospitals, power plants and infrastructure. Europe is opening its doors to Ukraine, but the EU Council cannot decide on the transfer of anti-missile systems to Ukraine," he said.

He proposed to postpone the vote on the Council's funding until the Council decides to provide Ukraine with Patriot missile defence systems. His proposal was supported by the majority of MPs, who voted in favour of postponing the vote until a decision on support for Ukraine is made.

It is also worth recalling that the European Union's Council of Foreign Ministers approved the allocation of €5 billion for military support to Ukraine. This decision was made on 18 March and published on the EU Council website. The funds will be allocated through the European Peace Facility (EPF). This will allow the EU to continue to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine by providing them with lethal and non-lethal military equipment and training for the Ukrainian military.

The support of its Western partners is currently quite important for Kyiv. Due to the uncertain situation in the United States, the prospects for the Ukrainian front are deteriorating significantly. For example, during a video meeting with the Ukrainian fundraising initiative UNITED24, Volodymyr Zelensky said that **Ukraine would lose the war if the US Congress did not approve military aid to counter Russian aggression**. "It is important to address Congress specifically: if Congress does not help Ukraine, Ukraine will lose the war. If Ukraine loses this war, other countries will be attacked. This is a fact," Zelensky told the meeting participants.<sup>2</sup> Volodymyr Zelensky also warned that in the coming weeks, Russia "will increasingly drag nuclear weapons into the discussion, threaten and rattle them"

In his turn, Franz-Stephan Gadi, a research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, noted that the war in Ukraine has entered a "transitional phase". "Russia is probing the frontline. It is trying to advance where it can. And it is preparing what appears to be a future offensive," Gadi said. He stressed that **European countries are trying to replace US aid**, but the support that Washington can provide "cannot be replaced." In particular, there are some weapons systems, such as air defence systems, that European countries simply cannot provide to Ukraine.

Nevertheless, Kyiv is actively pursuing a dialogue with Poland, Romania, and Spain on providing Ukraine with air defence systems. Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine's foreign minister, also confirmed in a Friday evening speech on Ukrainian news that active negotiations with allies are underway to purchase two Patriot air defence systems and one SAMP/T system. Although Kuleba did not mention specific countries, the FT reports that Ukraine is in talks with Poland and Spain for Patriot batteries from each, and with Romania for SAMP/T. One source confirmed that Ukraine needs seven such batteries. However, negotiations are becoming more complicated. Ukraine currently has at least three Patriot batteries and one SAMP/T battery, which it received in 2023.

At a weekly briefing this week, European diplomat Josep Borrell noted that it was surprising that Western countries could not provide Ukraine with seven additional Patriot

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<sup>2</sup> Зеленський: без допомоги США Україна програє війну, – CNN. 08.04.2024.  
[https://lb.ua/world/2024/04/08/607544\\_zelenskiy\\_bez\\_dopomogi\\_ssha\\_ukraina.html](https://lb.ua/world/2024/04/08/607544_zelenskiy_bez_dopomogi_ssha_ukraina.html)

batteries, given the presence of more than a hundred in their arsenal: "The argument that we cannot provide them is not convincing, given that European armies have about 100 Patriot batteries. But we are still unable to provide the seven [batteries] they are desperately asking for," he said.<sup>3</sup>

It is worth noting that **Germany previously transferred two of these air defence systems to Ukraine** out of its 12 batteries in 2023. Therefore, this week, German Foreign Minister Anne Lena Burbock announced that the stocks of Patriot batteries for possible transfer to Ukraine have been exhausted.

Polish President Andrzej Duda also told reporters that his country is unable to provide Ukraine with Patriot missile systems, as it is developing its own missile defence system. Finnish President Alexander Stubb explained the logic behind this step, noting that decisions on the transfer of strategic arms stockpiles remain with the military command of EU countries and are confidential. In contrast, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte said: "We can buy from them, we can deliver to Ukraine, we have the money. This is extremely important," he said upon arrival at the EU leaders' summit. He clarified that he was referring to countries that do not directly want to transfer air defence systems to Ukraine. Earlier, the Netherlands pledged €4 billion in military aid for Ukraine, as well as several Patriot systems.<sup>4</sup>

For his part, Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Ukraine was in line for Patriot and missiles for them, and it was difficult to agree with the West on new supplies. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said that the priority for 2024 is to provide Kyiv with Patriot or SAMP-T systems, and that the use of traditional methods of diplomacy has not been successful. It is clear that a difficult but important period is now approaching. **Russia continues to launch regular attacks on energy infrastructure. By doing so, it wants to turn Ukrainian cities into a desert and morally exhaust the country and its population. Moscow has high expectations for the summer offensive, hoping to make significant progress due to, among other things, the absence of population in the territories.** At the same time, Europe also needs to understand that if Kyiv falls, it will be the next target for Moscow, and it simply cannot withstand such a flood of refugees.

**All this means that Europe now needs to provide Ukraine with more support in the form of air defence systems. This course should be uncompromising and fast.** In addition, Brussels must protect it from turbulence factors, such as looming elections and the rise of parties with close ties to Russia. This is the only way to stop Moscow and ensure the security of the European region.

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<sup>3</sup> FT: Україна домовляється з Іспанією, Польщею та Румунією щодо передачі систем ППО. 13. 04.2024. <https://suspilne.media/724421-ft-ukraina-domovlaetsa-z-ispаниеu-polseu-ta-rumunieu-sodo-peredaci-sistem-ppo/>

<sup>4</sup> Прем'єр Нідерландів Рютте пропонує ЄС викупити системи Patriot для надання Україні. 17.04.2024. <https://censor.net/ua/n3484959>

## Foreign and Defense Policy of Ukraine

- *THEME ANALYSIS: NATO's 75th anniversary: without festive mood and in the midst of uncertainty*



Source: AFP

On 4 April 2024, Foreign Ministers gathered at NATO Headquarters to mark the 75th anniversary of the signing of the Alliance's founding document, the North Atlantic Treaty. Since 1949, the Alliance has worked to secure peace, democracy and prosperity for its 32 members and more than a billion people on both sides of the Atlantic. This year's NATO Day celebrations come just weeks after Sweden joined the Alliance as its thirty-second member.

In his 75th anniversary speech, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg welcomed the fact that "NATO is bigger, stronger and more cohesive than ever". He noted that the Founding Treaty, normally kept in Washington DC, was on display for the first time at NATO Headquarters, saying: "Never before has a single document with so few words meant so much to so many people. So much security, so much prosperity and so much peace. And it is all because of its solemn promise: that we will stand together and protect each other, as we have done for 75 years."

This celebration is a crucial step before the NATO summit in Washington in July, which is just three months away. The countdown can be said to be underway, as foreign ministers will be addressing the same issues as leaders during the summer summit: the situation in Ukraine, how to increase the alliance's support for Kyiv, Ukraine's prospects for joining NATO after Sweden and its path, and the search for a potential successor to Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who is due to step down this year after a decade in office.

One of the most pressing issues at the moment is military assistance to Ukraine. The delay in the transfer of US aid to Ukraine obliges Kyiv's European allies to do everything possible to support their Ukrainian partners who lack weapons. There are concerns about a possible Russian offensive in the coming months and the possibility of a breakthrough through Ukrainian defence lines. The mood, however, is slightly less gloomy than at the beginning of this year. ***"Now the situation is gloomy, but not catastrophic. Russia is moving forward, but***

*slowly,"* the NATO diplomat said.<sup>5</sup>

Previously, the problem was getting the shells to Ukraine, and while this issue has not yet been resolved, Allies are at least starting to produce and buy them outside of NATO around the world. While this is still not enough, the outlook is looking more encouraging. But for now, the main problem is air defence, especially missiles to protect Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. The source said that "neither Ukraine nor the alliance has enough of this, and we are not effective enough in this area now". Unlike projectiles, missiles cannot be purchased outside of NATO or produced quickly because they are technically more difficult.

One possible solution to the problem was proposed by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg just before the ministerial meeting. The idea is that NATO should provide Ukraine with a five-year military assistance package worth up to one hundred billion dollars. The money would come from all member states, and its distribution would depend on their gross national income, similar to the financing of the NATO common budget. The question, however, is whether all Allies will agree to join this initiative before the Summit.

The Secretary General's proposal largely reflects a trend that NATO officials describe as *"institutionalising assistance to Ukraine"*. In fact, it is an *attempt by the Alliance to "capture" various initiatives to help Ukraine*. For example, the United States-led Contact Group on Ukraine's Defence, known as **Ramstein**, brings together fifty countries whose representatives meet almost monthly to coordinate arms shipments to Ukraine. There is also the *Aviation Coalition*, a group of dozens of NATO allies that train Ukrainian pilots to fly F-16 fighter jets.

*NATO is considering establishing a kind of training mission in Ukraine to "intercept" the various efforts of individual member states, but the alliance has already faced obstacles. In particular, Hungary is currently opposed to this "nativisation".*

*With regard to Ukraine's approximation to NATO, last year's summit in Vilnius decided to cancel Ukraine's Membership Action Plan (MAP), a set of political and military reforms required before accession. However, no specific path to membership or date was given, only that "we can invite Ukraine to join the alliance when the allies agree and the conditions are met".*

**Since the Vilnius Summit, there has been little progress on this issue.** Some, especially on NATO's eastern flank, want to go beyond the "Vilnius language", while others do not. The terms are open to interpretation. Some are "measurable", like anti-corruption or security reforms. But the key that would unlock Ukraine's door to NATO seems to be war. However, most members of the alliance do not want a direct conflict with Russia, so membership is not very relevant as long as the fighting continues.

Despite the seemingly increased membership and greater attention, it is hard to call this anniversary a happy one. **Today, NATO has become more of a negotiating platform and political club than a real security structure capable of responding quickly and effectively to challenges and ensuring security in the region.** This was the result of a long process, when NATO found itself in a state of uncertainty after the end of the Cold War. By focusing its attention on building cooperation beyond the Atlantic region and focusing on soft threats, **it has transformed from a defence organisation to a security organisation.**

And there is no doubt that NATO is still a symbol of security for most states, but there are big questions about its actual involvement in political processes. We can already see how divisiveness, uncertainty, and years of ignoring the original purpose are atrophying the Alliance's ability to counter threats. **NATO is facing a real challenge to become a nominal category that will eventually lose its significance.**

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<sup>5</sup> НАТО святкує 75-річчя, але відчуває свій вік.04.04.2024. <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/nato-svyatkuye-75-richchya-ale-vidchuvaye-sviy-vik/32891434.html>



Source: Army FM

### ■ Changes at the front

**Trend:** *Russia is probing the front line, trying to advance where it can and preparing what will be a future offensive.*

*In the Volyn and Polissya directions*, no signs of offensive groups of the enemy were detected.

*In the Siverskyi and Slobozhanskyi directions*, the Russian Federation maintains a military presence in the border areas. The Russian Federation continues to carry out daily air strikes, artillery and mortar attacks in the vicinity of settlements in Kharkiv and Sumy regions.

*In the Kupyansk direction*, the Russian Federation almost did not conduct offensive actions, the situation remains unchanged, but the Russian Federation repeatedly carried out air strikes in the areas of Kupyansk, Sadove, Tabaivka, Petropavlivka and Ivanivka in the Kharkiv region.

In the Lyman direction, the Russian proxies are actively trying to advance in the area of Terny, Donetsk region, and have attempted to break through to Torske and Hryhorivka, Donetsk region. There are constant artillery and mortar attacks, as well as air strikes in the areas of Terny, Yampolivka and Zarichne in the Donetsk region.

*In the Bakhmut direction*, the Russian militants are actively trying to advance towards Chasiv Yar and are having some success, and are also advancing towards Verkhnekamianske, Vuymska, Bilohorivka, Ivanivske, Klishchivivka in the Donetsk region and Bilohorivka in the Luhansk region. The Russian proxies conducted air strikes in the vicinity of Sloviansk, Spirne, Verkhnekamianske and Hryhorivka in Donetsk region.

*In the Avdiivka direction*, the Russian Federation advanced to Ocheretyno, fighting



continues on the outskirts of the town, and the enemy is advancing towards Novokalynove, Netaylove and Berdychi in the Donetsk region. Air strikes are being carried out in the areas of Pervomayske, Solovyovo, Novobakhmutivka, Oleksandropil, Umanske, Yasnobrodivka, Karlivka, Ocheretyne in Donetsk region.

***In the Novopavlivka direction***, the enemy continues offensive actions towards Krasnohorivka and Novomykhailivka in the Donetsk region, but without significant success. The Russian Federation conducted air strikes in the areas of Antonivka, Kostyantynivka, Krasnohorivka, Oleksandropil, Vodiane and Vuhledar in the Donetsk region.

***In the Orikhovsk direction***, the Russian Federation is attacking in the areas of Robotyne in Zaporizhzhia region and Staromayorske and Urozhayne in Donetsk region. He carried out an air strike near Robotyne, Zaporizhzhya region, and Staromayorske, Donetsk region.

***In the Kherson direction***, the Russian enemy does not abandon its intention to force our units out of the footholds on the left bank of the Dnipro River. The Russian enemy is attacking and shelling our troops with artillery and mortars near Krynky, Kherson region.

#### ■ *Military assistance*

**Denmark** has announced the allocation of the 17th military aid package to Ukraine worth DKK 2.2 billion (USD 313 million). The majority of the aid will be allocated to the defence sector. The aid will be used to strengthen defence and industrial cooperation with Ukraine, including the purchase and transfer of weapons, ammunition, drones and missile components in cooperation with the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, and to increase Ukrainian production of artillery shells, missiles and drones.

**The Netherlands** has announced the allocation of €150 million to support the German Immediate Action for Air Defence initiative. This initiative aims to quickly provide Ukraine with long-range air defence capabilities together with partners.

**Czech Republic.** As part of the Czech initiative to supply Ukraine with artillery shells, contracts have already been signed for the purchase of the first 180,000 rounds of ammunition. The Czech government is also working on obtaining another 300,000 additional shells.

#### ■ *Russia: External and internal challenges*

### **Trend: *Moscow Patriarchate declares "holy war on Ukraine"***

On 27 March 2024, a historic event took place - in the Hall of Church Councils of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, under the chairmanship of Moscow Patriarch Kirill (in secular life, Vladimir Gundyayev), the "Order of the XXV World Russian People's Council", entitled ***"The Present and Future of the Russian World"***, was officially approved. This is one of the key moments in the formation of the Russian quasi-religious doctrine of the "Russian world", which is to become the official state and religious ideology of modern Russia under the auspices of the Putin regime.

This document is historic in many respects; as a product of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), it received the blessing of the Moscow Patriarch and other bishops. Most importantly, it defines how Russia should develop and build the "Russian world". It is therefore not surprising that even Vladimir Putin, albeit via video link, expressed his support for this meeting.

A significant characteristic is its distant resemblance to the programme documents of the pro-Nazi church movement known as the German Christians (DC). For example, it is partially

manifested in the "Directives" of May 1932 and the "10 Basic Principles" of May 1933, which outlined the new imperial-religious doctrine of the Third Reich, sanctioned expansionist and xenophobic ideas, and advocated the unification of church and state, as well as the synthesis of Christianity and National Socialism. The German Christians movement actually retreated from the principles of peace, love and forgiveness, which would make the people weak, and sought to monopolise the status of the only imperial church to serve the interests of the Hitler regime and Nazi Germany.

The programme document of the Russian Orthodox Church's World Russian People's Council and Patriarch Kirill's declaration of a "**holy war**" give the impression that some of its drafters were inspired by the models and ideas of the German Christians. For example, one of the drafters, Alexander Dugin, a member of the Presidium of the World Russian People's Council, has never concealed his sympathies for the ideas of fascism, early Nazism and the occult, which he introduced in a reinterpreted form into his concepts of **quasi-religious fundamentalism**.

Looking at the content of the document, the first paragraph of the "**Special Military Operation**" is the first time that official documents under the auspices of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate have called Russian aggression against sovereign Ukraine a "**war**". This is particularly significant, as until recently, the use of the term "war" to describe Russia's military invasion of Ukraine was prohibited in the Russian Federation. Moreover, the so-called "special military operation" against Ukraine was called a "holy war". Prior to this, Patriarch Kirill in his sermons called Russia's war in Ukraine "a metaphysical and existential struggle between the forces of good and evil".

The document states the following: *"From a spiritual and moral point of view, the Special Military Operation is a Holy War in which Russia and its people, defending the unified spiritual space of Holy Russia, fulfil the mission of the 'Keeper', who protects the world from the onslaught of globalism and the victory of the West, which has fallen into Satanism."* It is also claimed that "the Special Military Operation is a new stage in the national liberation struggle of the Russian people" against "the collective West, which has been waged on the lands of Southwestern Russia since 2014. ***In the course of the SOF, the Russian people are defending their lives, freedom, statehood, civilisational, religious, national and cultural identity, as well as the right to live on their own land within the borders of a united Russian state***".<sup>6</sup>

This programme document of the Russian Orthodox Church's World Russian People's Council denies the right of the Ukrainian people to their own identity, independence and statehood, stating that ***"after the completion of the WRPC, the entire territory of modern Ukraine should be included in the zone of Russia's exclusive influence"***. ***"The possibility of the existence of an 'independent Ukrainian state' on this territory should be completely excluded,"*** Moscow Patriarch Kirill (Vladimir Gundyayev) and other authors of the document state.

Every phrase of this paragraph completely contradicts the basic principles of Christianity, including the "Ten Commandments" (e.g., "do not kill", "do not steal", "do not bear false witness", "do not covet") and the Gospel ideals of love, peace, forgiveness, mutual respect and non-violence. Military invasions, aggression, murder and violence cannot be called and justified as "holy" from the point of view of the Gospel.

It represents a significant gap between the teachings of Christ and their interpretation in the context of military action. The use of the term "holy war" or "racial holy war" evokes associations with neo-Nazi anti-Christian movements, which is a contradiction to the basic principles of Christianity. It is also important to note that this document does not mention the name of Christ or refer to the Gospel.

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<sup>6</sup> «Звичайний фашизм»: розбір тез про «священну війну» Росії проти України та Заходу. 5.04.2024. <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/zvychnyy-fashyzm-rozbir-tez-pro-svyashchennuyu-voynu-rosiyi/32890534.html>

In particular, in the context of the "Fundamentals of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church", which states that "war is evil" and "murder, without which there are no wars, was considered a grave crime before God", this document creates contradictions. The Church also opposes the propaganda of war and violence, as well as various manifestations of hatred. Justifying or even approving of a war of aggression and the daily killing of citizens, which is called a "holy war", indicates a deviation from what the Church itself has previously proclaimed and a distortion and distortion of Orthodox doctrine.

But the document is also nothing more than a reflection of Russia's geopolitical intentions, including its claims to global leadership in the new world order. Moscow is tasked with becoming one of the leading centres of the multipolar world and regulating the balance of strategic interests in the new world order. At the same time, the document denies the right to independent existence of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. Instead, it puts forward the concept of the unity of the Russian people, including Great Russians, Little Russians and Belarusians, who are seen as branches of one nation. The restoration of this unity through the war against Ukraine is proclaimed to be a key condition for the survival and development of the "Russian world".

In addition, it is stated that in order to preserve Russia's sovereignty and civilisational identity in the twenty-first century, a steady and intensive natural population growth is necessary. The authors of the document believe that this task can be solved by cultivating a traditional large family. It is noted that the state should set a long-term strategic goal of reaching the Mendelian population of 600 million people in Russia in a hundred years. This is in line with the general desire of Russian officials to increase demographic indicators. Other points in the religious document that parallel Russian political trends are the recognition of the threat posed by migration from Central Asia, the destructive influence of the West, and the need for more intervention to foster a patriotic outlook among young people.

However, this high involvement of the Russian church in Russian politics is not a spontaneous phenomenon, but the result of an evolution that began a long time ago. For example, in December 2001, the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, which included the bishops of the UOC-MP, issued a separate decision in which it officially declared the usefulness of developing the activities of the World Russian People's Council as a permanent union of public organisations with the active participation and spiritual guidance of the Russian Orthodox Church. Consequently, the activities of this organisation under the spiritual guidance of the ROC MP received official blessing and authority from the governing body - the Synod of the ROC MP. According to the charter, the head of this organisation is the Moscow Patriarch.

For a long time, the AUCC was considered a "marginal" organisation, and many experts did not pay much attention to it. However, since the mid-1990s, it has acted as a kind of "laboratory" for the development, testing and promotion of neo-imperial quasi-religious ideas, which were later adopted by the ruling regime of the Russian Federation and used as a justification for expansionism and war against Ukraine. The organisation was created in 1993, shortly after the collapse of the USSR, with the aim of replacing the former CPSU and **consolidating Russian post-Soviet elites around a new Russian national idea that would replace the old communist ideology.**

In 2001, the role of the All-Russian Union of Nationalists grew significantly when Vladimir Putin personally opened its congress in the Cathedral Hall of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow. Not only representatives of the ROC MP and NGOs, but also high-ranking officials of various state and governmental structures of the Russian Federation, including the Chairman of the State Duma, the First Deputy Prime Minister, the leadership of the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as leaders of political parties, heads of the subjects of the Federation, and public and religious associations, began to participate in the work of the organisation.

Thus, the DECC gained influence both at the level of the ROC MP and at the level of

central and regional legislative and executive authorities in the Russian Federation. Its members also had consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council. It was the DECC that played a key role in the development of the "Russian World" doctrine, acting as a kind of "laboratory" for this ideological trend.

Historically, the ideas and narratives of the 'Russian World' were indeed presented by a variety of sources, including church hierarchs, politicians and public figures. This has made some question the existence of a coherent ideology of the 'Russian world', as these ideas seemed more like individual statements or slogans than a clear concept. However, this view does not take into account the differences between Western European and Russian mentality. Russian culture, unlike Western European culture, is characterised by less inclination towards a clear system of philosophical or ideological concepts. Instead, it is more often seen as a collection of loud slogans, myths and beliefs. Such an environment is conducive to the development of quasi-religious doctrines that can be used to mobilise society.

Although the ideology of the "Russian world" continues to evolve, its main vectors were defined in 2007 in the so-called "Russian Doctrine". The official "order" of the NSDC of 27 March 2024 defined a new stage in the formation of this ideology, which has now taken on distinct forms and openly confronts Christian doctrine. This "order" confirms that the Russian Orthodox Church is combining previous Kremlin narratives into a coherent ideology of the "Russian world".

**The main threat to Ukraine is that the UOC is still part of the Moscow Patriarchate, so the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine is still quite present.** We need to understand that for Moscow, religion is the same propaganda tool and means of destroying the Ukrainian nation and sovereignty as any other object of traditional power. The church is a tool aimed at Russia both inside and outside, at spreading destructive narratives in Ukraine and in the West, trying to make Moscow look like a defender of God and once again justify the war. Therefore, *we must not forget about this extremely dangerous spiritual threat.*