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## UKRAINE – THE EUROPEAN UNION



### KEY THEME ANALYSIS

#### ***THE NEW EU STRATEGY FOR FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: THE DESIRE TO "STRATEGIC AUTONOMY" AND DISTANCING FROM THE PROBLEMS OF EASTERN EUROPE***

*On June 28, 2016, the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Federica Mogherini introduced a new "Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy." This document aims to gain "strategic autonomy" in security policy, but neither proposes real sense for such goal, nor establishes adequate tools to achieve it.*

Thirteen years after the presentation of the previous, very optimistic European Union's security strategy named "A secure Europe in a better world" (2013), the Federica Mogherini's Office developed a new document that claims to be more sober, in particular, it **states that "peace and stability in Europe are no longer a given."**<sup>1</sup> However, the peace was never a given, so the words "no longer" indicate that Europe has not revalued the events of the past years and continues to consider the present state of affairs as anomaly, but not a logical development of over a dozen years of active building up of Russian military forces, mainly funded by the EU money paid for Russian oil and gas.

Overall, the document states many right things, including mentioning the expectations of partners that **the EU would play "a major role, including as global security provider"** (page 3 of the EU Global Strategy), the need to strengthen the EU contribution to security of the region and the world (p.5), the need for stronger EU responsibility "in a more contested world" (p.18). It is rightly noted that only the combined weight of the EU member states has the potential to deliver security and make a positive difference in the world (p.16).

Good news is that Brussels finally declares its awareness of the fact that **"in this fragile world, soft power is not enough;" and the EU member countries have to increase defence spending and "enhance our credibility in security and defence" to become able to protect the Europe** (p.44). However, the specific tasks of building up the EU's security and defence capacities are to be developed later – within the sectoral strategies to be agreed by the European Council. The Global Strategy only mentions in general terms the need to invest in intelligence, drones and satellite surveillance, better control of the borders, strengthening cyber defence capabilities, and "full-spectrum land, air, space and maritime capabilities" (p.45). The need for enhancing the deployability and interoperability of the forces through training and

<sup>1</sup> [http://eeas.europa.eu/top\\_stories/pdf/eugs\\_review\\_web.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf)

exercises is also stressed, as well as "tackling the procedural, financial and political obstacles which prevent the deployment of the Battlegroups" (p.47). The EU will also strive to create a solid European defence industry (p.11).

Through building up of the own defence capacities, the EU intends to achieve "autonomy of decision and action" (p.11), **"strategic autonomy"** (p.19). With that, it is noted that the EU will deepen its partnership with NATO, and **the U.S. will continue to be the core partner "on the broader security agenda"** (p.37). Obviously, it is about the EU's desire to be able to provide its own security, relying on the U.S. and NATO only in global security issues. These plans correspond with the statements by German and French politicians about the need for the European Union's own army, and with desire of Berlin and Paris to push Washington out of the European affairs.

However, the implementation of these plans will require from the EU to significantly increase defence spending to overtake arrears after decades of underfunding of the security sector. It should be kept in mind that Europe is critically dependent on the United States in security issues; and **hasty attempts to achieve "strategic autonomy" at the backdrop of unwillingness of major EU countries to sharply increase military spending could lead to the spread of security vacuum from the East of Europe to the whole continent.** Without assistance of the U.S., the EU (especially after the Brexit) would not be able to keep parity with Russia even in conventional weapons, not to mention the nuclear forces.

**Ambitions of Berlin and Paris on autonomy in European security issues is not backed with their commitments to spend significant additional funds on security and defence;** and the weakness of their current geopolitical weight is clearly demonstrated by inability of "Normandy" format to force Russia to fulfil the Minsk agreements. **Desire of the EU leaders to push the U.S. out of the European affairs may be dangerous primarily to the Eastern European countries, which put on the United States their main hopes in the issue of defence from Russia.**

The EU's vision of its own role in resolving regional conflicts, including in the Eastern Europe, brings no optimism. **Although the EU is going to engage in the resolution of protracted conflicts in the Eastern Partnership countries** (p.29), **but its key tools will be just the "carefully calibrated" sanctions, and diplomacy** (p.32). So, Kyiv should not count on more resolute support of the EU. Moreover, **the Strategy states that "none of these conflicts can be solved by the EU alone," so, the Union is going to engage "all those players present in a conflict and necessary for its resolution"** (p.29). **Obviously, it is about engaging Russia,** which is responsible for the beginnings of all protracted conflicts in the Eastern Partnership countries and is the major obstacle to their settlement. It is clear that **the engagement of the aggressor to conflicts "resolution" will bring nothing good for the victims.**

The EU Global Strategy states that **"managing the relationship with Russia represents a key strategic challenge"** (p.33). It would be more appropriate to talk about a threat, and not a challenge. But the EU has not even dared to call Russia a challenge; instead it called "managing the relationship" a challenge. This pussyfooting reflects the whole EU's security approach towards Russia and the Eastern Europe. Although the Strategy states that **the EU "will not recognise Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea nor accept the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine"**, but simultaneously **the Union expresses its readiness to cooperate with Russia "if and when our interests overlap."** The Strategy also declares support for **"deeper societal ties" with the Russian civil society and business** (p.33) that does not really fit in with the regime of sanctions. **Measures to support Ukraine are not mentioned at all, it is only said about the EU's intention to "enhance the**

**resilience of our eastern neighbours**, and uphold their right to determine freely their approach towards the EU" (p.33). "Resilience" is defined in the Strategy as "the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises" (p.23). Of course, reforms are necessary, but it is naive to believe that reforms alone are enough to deter Russian tanks and artillery.

***The new EU Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy declares the need to strengthen European Union's own defence capabilities, but not in order to be able to protect itself from aggressive Russian actions, but to become more independent from the U.S.*** It is hard to imagine how the EU is going to implement its goals, given the constant underfunding of security and defence sector, and especially after the exit from the EU of its strongest military actor, the UK.

*The Global Strategy does not promise much good for Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership countries – the issue of their security is not listed among the EU priorities, moreover, Brussels plans to resolve regional conflicts together with the aggressor country, Russia.*



## UKRAINE – NATO



### KEY THEME ANALYSIS

#### ***NATO SUMMIT: BATTALIONS TO BECALM THE BALTIC COUNTRIES, BILLIONS TO SUPPORT AFGHANISTAN, AND MYSTERIOUS PACKAGE OF MEASURES FOR UKRAINE***

*On July 8-9, 2016, at the Warsaw NATO Summit, the Allies took decisions aimed at becalming the Baltic States and Poland, multi-billion military assistance to Afghanistan, support to Georgia's preparation for membership, and strengthening practical help to Ukraine actually in exchange for abandoning membership prospects...*

The most welcome Alliance's decision was to **deploy on a rotational basis four multinational battalion-sized battlegroups in the Baltic States and Poland since 2017** (paragraph 40 of the Warsaw Summit Communiqué). The U.S. serves as framework nation for the multinational presence in Poland, Great Britain in Estonia, Canada in Latvia, and only one country of the continental Europe serves as framework nation, namely Germany in Lithuania. Of course, four thousand troops would not be able to fight off a possible Russian aggression, and their main purpose is to reassure the population of the Baltic countries, who express doubts about the effectiveness of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. **Actually, those troops will serve as a "human shield" with aim to automatically enable the Article 5 in case of Russian aggression. However, there is no guarantee that it would work in case of hybrid scenario**, for example, under the guise of local uprising inspired by Russia, as it has happened in Donbas. Paragraph 72 of the Warsaw NATO Communiqué, which refers to the application of Article 5 in case of hybrid aggression, does not sound too convincing: **"The primary responsibility to respond to hybrid threats or attacks rests with the targeted nation. ... The Council could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty."**<sup>2</sup> The difference between "could" and "will" is obvious.

Another Alliance's high profile solution was to **"recognise cyberspace as a domain of operations** in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea" (paragraph 70). Cyber defence will be integrated into operational planning and Alliance operations and missions. Actually, one should note that **this decision is long overdue – it should have been taken several years ago, when Russia launched massive cyber attacks against the Baltic countries.**

NATO also decided to strengthen its presence in the Black Sea region,

<sup>2</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133169.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm)



**supporting the Romanian initiative to establish a "multinational framework brigade"** (p.41), but this issue is not enough detailed in the Communiqué.

At the Warsaw Summit, **the achievement of the NATO "BMD Initial Operational Capability"** was declared that includes the U.S. BMD-capable Aegis ships in Spain, the Aegis Ashore site in Romania, and the forward-based early-warning BMD radar in Turkey. Intention to build the Aegis Ashore site in Poland was confirmed (p.57). **The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, were called "the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies"** (p.53).

Secretary General of the Alliance expressed satisfaction that the NATO countries began to gradually increase their military spending; although, currently **only five of the twenty-eight members meet the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product on defence.**

The Allies took commitment **to contribute annually till 2020 up to \$1 billion to finance the Afghan army** (in addition to the billions of dollars provided by the United States). If to compare this amount of assistance with the one provided by the Allies to Ukraine, the priorities become clear. NATO also took decisions on **strengthening military training mission for Iraq (primary, for the purpose of confronting the ISIS)**, and on assistance to other partner countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

**Many provisions of the Warsaw Summit Communiqué are devoted to Russia's aggressive actions** against Ukraine, at the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean seas, and in Syria; Russia's "provocative military activities in the periphery of NATO territory" is also mentioned (paragraphs 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19 of the Communiqué). It is claimed that Russia violated a number of its legal and political obligations, including the provisions of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act (p.9). **It is importantly declared in the Communiqué that "Russia bears full responsibility for the serious deterioration of the human rights situation on the Crimean peninsula, in particular the discrimination against the Crimean Tatars and other members of local communities"** (p. 17).

However, Moscow would apparently consider most important the paragraph 39 of the Communiqué, which states that **"deterrence has to be complemented by meaningful dialogue and engagement with Russia."** The Kremlin always perceives readiness for dialogue as a sign of weakness, and Moscow considers weakness as an incentive to increase the aggression. Russia was quick to prove it in practice, and just one day after the fruitless meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at ambassadorial level, which took place in Brussels, **on July 13, the Russian military announced their intention to place in the Crimea, in August 2016, the anti-aircraft missile systems S-400 "Triumph."**<sup>3</sup> This was the response of Moscow to Jens Stoltenberg's call for dialogue, Frank Steinmeier's call to avoid "unnecessary aggravations,"<sup>4</sup> and ***Francois Hollande's statement that Russia should not be considered a threat, but rather a partner: "Russia is a partner which, it is true, may sometimes, and we have seen that in Ukraine, uses force which we have condemned when it annexed Crimea"***.<sup>5</sup>

The Warsaw Summit Communiqué states that "independent, sovereign and stable **Ukraine**, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security." **NATO will continue to support Ukraine in carrying out its**

<sup>3</sup> <http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/3456809>

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.dw.com/uk/штайнмаєр-застрепигає-від-рецидиву-конфронтації-між-росією-та-нато/a-19386566>

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.rferl.org/content/hollande-russia-is-a-partner-not-a-threat/27847690.html>

**reforms "in the framework of our Distinctive Partnership"** (p.117). In paragraphs 118, it is said that "NATO will continue to provide strategic advice and practical support to the reform of Ukraine's security and defence sector, including as set out in the **Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP)**." The CAP was endorsed at the meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of Heads of State and Government. In *Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission* it is said that the "CAP contains more than 40 areas where NATO will support Ukraine in reforms,"<sup>6</sup> but nothing is specified concerning the areas and amount of the assistance. Such mysteriousness is unusual in the NATO practice – for example, the *Joint Statement of the NATO-Georgia Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers* specifies the areas of assistance to Georgia: increased support for Georgia's Training and Education, strategic communications, air defence and air surveillance, self-defence and resilience, security in the Black Sea region.<sup>7</sup>

**The outcome of the Summit with implications of strategic nature for Ukraine-NATO relations is the removal of membership issue from the agenda. In paragraph 111 of the Warsaw Communiqué, the 2008 Bucharest Summit decision is reaffirmed only for Georgia, but not for Ukraine, which also was promised a membership prospect.** In paragraph 110, NATO reaffirms its commitment to the open door policy, but only Georgia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are mentioned in the list of partners who aspire to join the Alliance. There is no word about the prospect of membership in the Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission as well.

After the meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, **Jens Stoltenberg said that Ukraine did not raise the issue of membership: "President Poroshenko made it clear that the issue of membership is not yet on the agenda."**<sup>8</sup> Instead, Petro Poroshenko said that it was he agreed "to launch a process that will allow Ukraine to get a status of partnership with advanced features," referring to the "Enhanced Opportunities Programme", launched in 2014 for Australia, Finland, Sweden, Jordan and Georgia.<sup>9</sup> But, firstly, **this agreement is mentioned neither in Warsaw communiqué, nor in the Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission.** Secondly, Georgia's participation in this program does not prevent it from simultaneous aspire for membership, so, it should not prevent Ukraine as well.

**It should be noted that President's decision to remove the issue of membership from the agenda was taken against the background of an unprecedented level of support for joining NATO among the Ukrainians.** According to the poll conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre in May 2016, **78% of voters would have supported Ukraine joining NATO in a referendum.**<sup>10</sup>

*Despite the high expectations, the Warsaw Summit has not brought solutions that would fundamentally change the security situation in the Eastern Europe. **Four battalions in the Baltic are just a political signal appealing to the common sense, but the problem is that the Kremlin's actions indicate the lack of common sense.** What Moscow sees is its dominance in manpower and technology, and the weakness of the Alliance which outstretches its hand for dialogue.*

<sup>6</sup> <http://nato.mfa.gov.ua/ua/press-center/news/49117-spilyna-zajava-komisiji-ukrajina-nato-pid-chas-varshavskykogo-samitu>

<sup>7</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133175.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133175.htm)

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/27849253.html>

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.dw.com/uk/столтенберг-україна-не-порушує-питання-про-членство-в-нато/a-19390454>

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.dif.org.ua/en/publications/press-relizy/samit-nato-perspektivi-ukraini.htm>

*As for Ukraine, its level of ambition in relations with NATO finally slid to its lowest since 1992, namely just regular cooperation. Even under the Yanukovych Presidency, the level of relations with NATO was higher and was designated as "constructive partnership". Ukraine can forget the prospects of NATO membership during the Poroshenko Presidency. This posture of the "guarantor" of Ukraine's national security is even more shameful given that he abandoned NATO membership on his own initiative and in favour of Russia in contradiction with the will of the Ukrainian people, 78% of which support membership in NATO. (No wonder, given that Ukraine's best sons are dying in the Russia-Ukraine war). So, it is reasonable to consider these posture and policy of President as anti-national.*





## FOREIGN POLICY OF UKRAINE



### KEY THEME ANALYSIS

#### **VISITS TO UKRAINE OF THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN KERRY AND THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER JUSTIN TRUDEAU**

*The visit of the U.S. Secretary of State was marked by the refusal of Ukraine to aspire for joining NATO; the visit the Canadian Prime Minister was distinguished by the signing of the Free Trade Agreement.*

**A visit to Kyiv of the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry** was held just before the NATO Warsaw Summit. This made the experts expect that the final agreements on the assistance to Ukraine would be discussed at the meeting, as well the issue of including to the Warsaw Summit's documents of the provision to reaffirm the 2008 Bucharest Summit decision on the prospects of Ukraine's membership in NATO.

However, the reality proved to be different. At the joint press conference following talks with the President of Ukraine, **John Kerry said: "He himself and your country has not yet made a decision as to whether or not you even want to apply for [NATO] membership."**<sup>11</sup> Obviously, right now the membership issue is not on the table, and the main thing is to stake out the perspective. But if Kyiv initiates taking the issue off the agenda explaining it by the "uncertainty," then the Alliance would not feel responsible for the promises of membership to such an inconsistent partner. Respectively, the final documents of the Warsaw NATO Summit contain the reference on the Bucharest Summit membership promise relating only to Georgia, but not Ukraine. **Actually, Kyiv has already fulfilled the requirement of Moscow to abandon NATO membership prospect, while has not received any concessions in return from the Kremlin.**

According to the official Internet site of the Ukrainian President, "John Kerry thanked President Petro Poroshenko and his team for persistence and commitment to reforms": "Due to the tough decisions of President Poroshenko, the economy of Ukraine is growing."<sup>12</sup> And the **Deutsche Welle wrote that John Kerry stressed on how much still remains to be done:** "I discuss today with the President and other leaders of Ukraine the lustration of the Prosecutor General's Office and of the judiciary, fighting corruption and eliminating the influence of oligarchs, enhancing cooperation with the

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/07/259428.htm>

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zustrich-petra-poroshenka-ta-dzhona-kerri-ukrayina-bezperech-37579>

IMF, strengthening of Ukrainian financial system, and privatization."<sup>13</sup>

The parties also talked about the Russia-Ukraine conflict, but the official media lack detailed information on the results of the dialogue. The Presidential website quotes mostly Petro Poroshenko, and John Kerry's position is given in general terms, just some general words about the support of full implementation of the Minsk agreements and about the non-recognition of the Crimea annexation.<sup>14</sup> It was also reported that John Kerry promised **to grant Ukraine \$23 million of humanitarian aid** for victims of the war in Donbas.

More information about true position of the U.S. is available from the interview of the Ambassador Geoffrey R. Pyatt, published right in time of John Kerry's visit. **Geoffrey R. Pyatt clearly said: "First a complete cease-fire should come, and only then the elections could be held."**<sup>15</sup> That means that for Washington, as well as for Berlin and Paris, the main prerequisite for the election is cease-fire, and not the withdrawal of Russian troops as Kyiv insists. Ambassador, who is going to leave Ukraine, was rather frank when talking on the most annoying issues: *"Most often I have to explain to Washington why reforms in Ukraine are not as fast as everyone would like. As well as why oligarchs still have power, and why despite strong desire of Ukrainians to fight corruption, it still exists."*<sup>16</sup>

A few days after John Kerry's visit, the **Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau arrived to Kyiv**. His visit was marked by the signing on July 11, 2016, of the **Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Ukraine**. This important document envisages withdrawing during seven years of 99% of bilateral trade barriers; it also opens the reciprocal access of producers to the government procurement in Canada and Ukraine.

Justin Trudeau visited the Yavoriv training area in Lviv region to observe the work of 22 Canadian military trainers. Ukrainian President said it was agreed that Canadian instructors will continue to work in Ukraine in 2017.

*The latest visits of distinguished guests from the U.S. have not been defined by any significant agreement on cooperation. Mostly, the visitors have talked about the implementation of the Minsk agreements on not too favorable (for Kyiv) conditions. This time, the visit of John Kerry was also marked by actual closing of the chapter on Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic ambitions. It is obvious that Barack Obama's lack of sympathy for Ukraine is supplemented with Washington's irritation with Kyiv's lack of political will to reform and eradicate corruption, which actually remains the basis for the current authorities in Ukraine.*

*The visit of the Canadian Prime Minister was marked by the signing of an important agreement on free trade between Canada and Ukraine. However, only successfully reformed Ukraine would be able to take advantages of the free trade with Canada, as well as in case of the DCFTA with the EU. If everything remains as it is now, then only the foreign producers would benefit, and Ukraine would remain just a consumer.*

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.dw.com/uk/кепті-говорити-про-членство-україни-в-нато-зарано/a-19386424>

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.president.gov.ua/news/ssha-zalishayutsya-klyuchovim-soyuznikom-ukrayini-u-protidii-37577>

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/07/8/7114133>

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/07/8/7114133>