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## UKRAINE – THE EUROPEAN UNION



### KEY THEME ANALYSIS

#### **MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE: THE WEST CONTINUES ITS FUTILE FLIRTATION WITH RUSSIA**

*In his notorious Munich speech, in 2007, Vladimir Putin warned of Russia's intentions to restore its previous sphere of influence; but world's leaders did not take his words seriously. Since then, Russia has started three wars – in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. In 2016, Dmitry Medvedev announced the return of 'Cold War' and hinted on probability of the third world war. But officials of the U.S. and "old" Europe still believe it's just rhetoric, and constantly seek cooperation with the aggressor state.*

**On February 12-14, 2016, at the conference in Munich**, global security issues were discussed by three dozen heads of state and government, seventy ministers of defense and foreign affairs, and several hundred officials and politicians from different countries.

The difference in agenda of the current of Munich conference from the previous one indicates the inability of the flexible West to successfully resist Russia's aggressive plans. A year ago, Russian aggression against Ukraine was the top theme of the Munich conference; since that time **Moscow managed to put Ukrainian issues on the back burner, distracting world's attention with the Syrian military campaign, which resulted in increasing flow of refugees to Europe.**

Similar to the previous year, reaction of the Western leaders is inadequate again – instead of searching for a common response to the new Russian aggression, the U.S. and EU officials seek for common positions with Moscow to resolve the Syrian crisis, while its aggravation is being provoked by Russia itself.

On May 12, the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier made boast of agreement to reduce violence and stop hostilities in Syria in a week. Such agreement was reached in Munich, at the **negotiations of the contact group on Syria** with participation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.<sup>1</sup> It seems that the Western leaders have not learned lessons from the previous peace negotiations with Russia (including those on Ukraine) and they really believed that Moscow would perform the new arrangements. The following days showed that the skeptics were right – Russian troops did not suspend their support for the Syrian dictator.

Even **Dmitry Medvedev's frank statement on returning of the Russia-West relations to the "Cold War"** did not have sobering effect. In his speech **Russian Prime Minister reminded of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and**

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.dw.com/uk/контактна-група-з-сирії-досягла-згоди/a-19043845>

**actually threatened the West with World War III:** "The current architecture of European security, which was built on the ruins of World War II, allowed us to avoid global conflicts for more than 70 years ... But do we need one more, third global tragedy to understand that what we need is cooperation rather than confrontation?"<sup>2</sup>

However, the U.S. State Department spokesperson **Joshua Baker**,<sup>3</sup> EU Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Representative **Federica Mogherini**<sup>4</sup> and German Foreign Minister **Frank-Walter Steinmeier** do not notice any "Cold War."<sup>5</sup> Neither do they believe like Lithuanian President **Dalia Grybauskaitė** that the war has already come to the "hot" stage. Instead, **Joshua Baker** considers that despite the "serious differences over the Ukrainian crisis," "there are good opportunities for cooperation with the Russian Federation," noting the example of agreement on Iran's nuclear program.<sup>6</sup> By the way, illusions about the Iranian "compromise" are unlikely to last long, given that Moscow plans to transfer to Tehran's the S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems.<sup>7</sup>

U.S. Secretary of State **John Kerry** in his speech at the Munich conference called on Russia to "withdraw weapons and troops from the Donbas; ensure that all Ukrainian hostages are returned; allow full humanitarian access to occupied territories."<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, he noted that Ukraine also "has responsibilities with respect to Minsk," thus actually playing along with Moscow, which seeks to persuade that Kyiv also does not fulfill Minsk agreements.

**U.S. Senator John McCain** was sober as always in his assessment of **Russia's policy and of prospects to reach diplomatic compromise with Moscow**. Mr. McCain noted that V.Putin used flows of refugees to destabilize Europe and tried to consolidate Russia's permanent military presence in Syria on the model of Kaliningrad and Crimea. Senator rightly pointed out that **Russian policy succeeded "only because the West let it happen."**<sup>9</sup>

Chairman of the German Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee **Norbert Röttgen** urged the participants of the Munich conference not to give up the Ukrainian interests in exchange for the delusive agreement on Syria. He called **a huge mistake the possible concessions in Ukrainian issue for the sake of arrangements on Syria**.<sup>10</sup>

**NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg**, on the one hand, promised to "respond firmly" to Russian aggressive actions; but on the other hand, he said that the response lies with "both more defense and more dialogue," and that he **had agreed with Sergey Lavrov "to explore the possibility for convening a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council."**<sup>11</sup>

Leaders of the Eastern European NATO members did not exude optimism about the prospects of dialogue with Putin's Russia. **Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski said in Munich that NATO–Russia Founding Act of 1997 had lost its relevance due to the Russian aggression**, and the Alliance should build a military infrastructure in Eastern Europe.<sup>12</sup>

**Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko held a number of meetings in the margins of the Munich conference** – with John Kerry, Jens Stoltenberg,

<sup>2</sup> <http://sputniknews.com/russia/20160214/1034743449/medvedev-munich-speech.html>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.dw.com/uk/підсумки-мюнхена-похмурі-прогнози-та-слабкі-надії/a-19048322>

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2016/02/15/7044865>

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.dw.com/uk/політики-єс-по-різному-зрозуміли-слова-медведева-про-холодну-війну/a-19046864>

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/27551051.html>

<sup>7</sup> <http://ria.ru/world/20160215/1374647736.html>

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/02/252486.htm>

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2016/02/14/7044846>

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2016/02/14/7044847>

<sup>11</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_128069.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_128069.htm)

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2016/02/13/7044834>

Martin Schulz, Federica Mogherini, the Presidents of Poland, Lithuania, Romania and Finland – urging them to help Ukraine in implementing reforms and to keep sanctions until Russia fulfills its Minsk obligations. Petro Poroshenko commented on Dmitry Medvedev's words about the alleged civil war in Ukraine: **"Mr. Putin, it is your aggression, not a civil war in Ukraine. It is not a civil war in Crimea, it is your troops who occupied my country."**<sup>13</sup> Ukrainian President also reminded to those, who support the resumption of cooperation with Russia, about the results of their previous compliant policy: *"Let me recall that in 2008 Russia occupied a part of Georgia, and in 2010 there had been a lot of voices to resume cooperation with Russia. Did they manage to prevent the annexation of the Crimea? Did they manage to prevent the invasion in Donbas? Did they manage to prevent Syria?"*<sup>14</sup>

*The West will not be able to stop the proliferation of Russian aggression as long as it plays under the Moscow-imposed rules. This is not a compromise – to give up the interests of one victim of Russian aggression for the sake of reducing the intensity of fire on another front. This is defeat of the civilized world to the cynical actions of the aggressor, which captures one new position after another. The West should understand that **Russia creates numerous hot spots not only to gain new territories for its military bases, but above all to destroy the present world order**, and to return international relations back to XIX and XX centuries.*



<sup>13</sup> <http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/petro-poroshenko-na-myunhenskij-konferenciyi-yedinij-zasib-z-36727>

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2016/02/13/7044815>

## UKRAINE – NATO



### KEY THEME ANALYSIS

#### **THE ANNUAL NATIONAL PROGRAMME OF NATO – UKRAINE COOPERATION 2016: GOOD INTENTIONS, BUT MORE SPECIFICS IS NEEDED**

On February 12, 2016, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko signed a decree approving the Annual National Programme of NATO – Ukraine Cooperation for 2016<sup>15</sup> (ANP). It is a positive signal that ANP-2016 was approved in the beginning of the year, unlike many previous Programmes, which had been approved badly behind time. ANP-2016 assigns a number of important tasks to reform the defense sector according to NATO standards. However, similar to the previous Programmes, in ANP-2016 the general wordings prevail over the specific planned measures.

Adoption of the Annual National Programme of NATO – Ukraine cooperation in the first half of February 2016 provides an opportunity to implement its provisions for almost 11 months to compare with 8 months in case of ANP-2015 approved in late April. Unfortunately, this is the only advantage of ANP-2016 over the previous relevant documents.

Unlike the previous Programme, ANP-2016 does not refer to NATO membership as Ukraine's **strategic goal**. ANP-2016 defines "**development of distinctive partnership with NATO**" as a priority area of Ukraine's security policy [p.1]; and a priority task is set as "**achieving full compatibility of the security and defense sector with the relevant structures of NATO member states, to ensure in future the possibility of Ukraine's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance**" [p.2]. The "**long-term goal of joining the all-European security system, based on NATO**" is also mentioned in ANP-2016 [p.1]. Several different and confusing wordings (including the non-existent "all-European security system"), instead of a clearly defined strategic goal of preparation for the NATO membership, reflect the general style of the ANP, which contains many common, indistinctly specified objectives of declarative nature.

Similar to the previous Programmes, a significant portion of the ANP-2016 consists of such common wordings as "in-depth and immediate reforming," "consolidating democracy," and etc. **ANP-2016 includes almost all the directions of Ukraine's state policy, regardless of their relevance to cooperation with NATO**. For example, the ANP repeatedly refers to the implementation of the National Strategy for Human Rights [p.5, p.7] approved by Ukrainian President in 2015, but nothing is said about its relevance to Ukraine's cooperation with NATO. Even more

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/452016-19779>



questionable is relevance of such ANP-2016 "priority task" as *"to ensure the functioning of the National public television and radio broadcasting company of Ukraine"* [p.8], and of such "key measures" for 2016 as *"to take measures in support of the National public TV and radio company of Ukraine according to the Law of Ukraine "On Public television and radio broadcasting of Ukraine..."*; as well as *"to take measures on implementation, as specified by legislation, of the first phase of reforming of the state and municipal print media"* [p.8-9]. May be NATO is going to assist Ukraine in these tasks? But ANP-2016 says nothing about such possible help... A large number of such provisions, which have no direct relevance to cooperation with NATO, make it difficult to assess the effectiveness of ANP implementation and the effectiveness of Ukraine – NATO cooperation in general.

It would be almost impossible to assess the effectiveness of a large number of ANP-2016 tasks and measures, which are formulated like the following: "to continue studying experience," "to continue studying standards," "to hold consultations," "to extend opportunities," "to establish the proper conditions for effective cooperation," and etc.

**At the same time, ANP-2016 defines many important, clearly specified tasks directly related to Ukraine – NATO cooperation and aimed at reforming the defense and security sector.** For example, ANP-2016 envisages the implementation of criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of measures to prevent corruption in defense and security sector – within the framework of NATO Building Integrity Programme [p.12]; and the corresponding training courses are planned with the participation of the experts from NATO member states [p.13]. Efficient measures for Ukraine – NATO cooperation are envisaged in the sphere of energy security [p.15-20]; protection of critical infrastructure [p.20-22]; implementation of democratic civilian control over the Ukraine's security and defense sector, in particular, "to ensure the annual White Book publication by the entities of Ukraine's security and defense sector" [p.45].

ANP-2016 defines clearly set objectives for the "Development of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and the reconstruction of the state border." In particular, it is planned: to implement measures of joint operational boundary protection with the countries of the European Union – Poland, Slovak Republic, Romania and Hungary, as well as with Moldova; to establish within NATO Trust Fund on improving command, control, communication and information – a project on development of surface monitoring system; to arrange with NATO support a training in standardization and codification for the staff of State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, and etc. [p.49-50].

The ANP-2016 provision that defines a task "to develop a strategy of countering Russian campaigns of misinformation and propaganda in Ukraine, taking into account the experience of NATO member states" [p.32] is questionable. It should be better a mutual exchange of experience between Ukraine and NATO experts, because actually the Allies also lack successful experience of countering Russian propaganda. ANP-2016 also provides for the "development of strategic communications model in Ukraine," but only experts of NATO and central authorities of Ukraine are mentioned to be involved in this process [p.34], while it would be advisable to invite Ukrainian scientists and experts with good relevant experience as well.

*ANP-2016 looks more like a digest of tasks copied out from the working plans of various Ukrainian ministries and departments, than like an individually designed coherent document to coordinate Ukraine's course toward integration into NATO. The current format of the ANP document limits its value to data reporting, lacking the strategic purport. It would be advisable **to develop a fundamentally new type of ANP, which would correspond to the format of NATO Membership Action Plan** – to effectively guide Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration course.*

## FOREIGN POLICY OF UKRAINE



### KEY THEME ANALYSIS

#### **MINSK PROCESS IN THE DEADLOCK**

*The decision of "Normandy" Four leaders to extend validity of the Minsk agreements to 2016 predictably has not solved the main problem. Russia has not fulfilled any one of the agreements provision, expecting that the fatigued West would ultimately force Ukraine to unilaterally implement all Minsk provisions. Kyiv, for its part, makes clear that the limit of unilateral concessions has been reached. Anyway, Kyiv's further concessions without adequate Moscow's position would not bring peace, but could become devastating for Ukrainian statehood.*

In February 2016, Moscow-backed separatists under the command of Russian officers stepped up attacks on Ukrainian positions with Russian weapons and ammunition, the supply of which the Kremlin has significantly increased. Thus, **Russia continues violations of the first provision of the Minsk agreements, which required the ceasefire.**

However, the Western counterparts believe that Kyiv must keep on fulfilling the Minsk agreements unilaterally. In early February 2016, the **German Bundestag delegation arrived to Kyiv** and tried to convince its Ukrainian colleagues to pass legislation that would "shape the legal framework for the elections in Donbas" – to "put Russia in a situation when it would be compelled to secure free and fair elections at this territory" (German Bundestag deputy Manuel Sarrazin).<sup>16</sup> It is hard to say why the German MP believes that Moscow can provide free and fair elections in Donbas, while Russian troops are not withdrawn and participation of Ukrainian parties and media in the elections is forbidden.

**Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevičius does not have such illusions:** "Imagine elections with one party, one media and non-credible international observers. Imagine that half of the electorate was forced to escape and was deprived of the right to vote. It is an undemocratic, unjust and illegitimate scenario, but this is exactly how the elections in Donbas would look like, if Ukraine is forced to implement political reforms prior to Moscow fulfills its obligations."<sup>17</sup> **Member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Ben Cardin has similar opinion:** "I understand that our Ukrainian friends must also implement the

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2016/02/2/7044266>

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.wsj.com/articles/security-before-politics-in-eastern-ukraine-1453927627>

*political elements of Minsk – constitutional reforms and elections – but we must see real progress from the Russians on the security front first.*"<sup>18</sup>

Kyiv expresses its willing to compromise, and is ready to agree that not Ukraine, but the OSCE would have access to the Ukraine-Russia border as a precondition for the elections in Donbas.<sup>19</sup> But Russia blocks such scenario as well – although the OSCE has mandate for the whole territory of Ukraine, but Moscow-controlled militants restrict the freedom of movement of the observers.

In the first half of February, while meeting with Angela Merkel, John Kerry, Martin Schulz, Federica Mogherini, the G-7 and the EU ambassadors – Ukrainian President **Petro Poroshenko** tried to convince counterparts in the impossibility of further unilateral fulfillment of the Minsk agreements by Ukraine, without adequate steps of Russia.

On February 13, during a ministerial meeting of the "Normandy" Four at the Munich conference, **Pavlo Klimkin notified his colleagues that Russia had intensified transfer of weapons to militants**. He also reminded of the necessity to provide unimpeded **access of the OSCE SMM members to the whole territory of Donbas, including the state border**, and raised the issue of **arrests and oppression of the Crimean Tatars** at the occupied peninsula. However, **negotiations failed to produce any definite results**; parties only preliminarily agreed to hold the next meeting in early March, in Paris.

Moscow's reluctance to implement Minsk agreements and stepping up attacks by Russia-backed separatists make official Kyiv ponder over the alternatives to the Minsk process and the "Normandy" format. In early February, Petro Poroshenko talked about the absence of any alternatives to the Minsk agreements. But in the middle of the month, **the presidential adviser, the Director of the National Institute for Strategic Studies, Volodymyr Horbulin** said the following: "Statement that the negotiation process has no other alternatives, i.e. cannot be transformed, articulates the deadlock situation." That is why **"the fulfillment by Ukraine of its obligations under the Minsk agreements should not hinder searching for the ways to improve the negotiation process on Donbas and Crimea."** Volodymyr Horbulin also stated that **"the main problem of the Minsk agreement is not as much the impossibility of their full implementation, but the fact that even their fulfillment will bring almost no changes. It will just fix the present political status quo."**<sup>20</sup>

*So, we have reasons to believe that official Kyiv is gradually coming to conclusion that the Minsk process has exhausted itself, as its guarantors from the "Normandy" Four failed to force Russia fulfill its part of obligations. At the same time, Ukraine can no longer afford itself the unilateral concessions, which may be dangerous to its statehood. If the next meeting of the "Normandy" Four, scheduled for March, brings no results, Kyiv will have to seek for a new negotiating format, which will include the Crimean issue to the negotiation agenda.*

<sup>18</sup> [http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/cardin-statement-on-minsk-ii-anniversary\\_](http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/cardin-statement-on-minsk-ii-anniversary_)

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/interview/2016/02/12/7044721>


<sup>20</sup> [http://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/chi-ye-zhittya-pislya-minska-mirkuvannya-schodo-neminuchosti-neobhidnih-zmin-\\_html](http://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/chi-ye-zhittya-pislya-minska-mirkuvannya-schodo-neminuchosti-neobhidnih-zmin-_html)




## PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

*A survey was held by the Sociological Group "Rating" (Rating Group Ukraine) on January 14-22, 2016. Sample: 2000 respondents aged 18 and older.<sup>21</sup>*

**If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to the European Union was held today, how would you vote?**




**If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to NATO was held today, how would you vote?**




<sup>21</sup> [http://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg\\_files/electoral\\_and\\_social\\_moods\\_012016\\_press.pdf](http://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/electoral_and_social_moods_012016_press.pdf);  
[http://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg\\_files/rg\\_politics\\_012016.pdf](http://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_politics_012016.pdf)

**If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan was held today, how would you vote?**



**What is your attitude toward the following world leaders?**



## Dynamics of Ukrainian people's attitude toward certain world leaders

