

# INTERNATIONAL WEEKLY

**№ 9,10**

**06.03.2012-20.03.2012**



Friedrich Naumann  
STIFTUNG  
FÜR DIE FREIHEIT

# UKRAINE – THE EUROPEAN UNION

## Key theme analysis: *Ukrainian Sliding down*

The beginning of May has been marked with quite a significant event in the EU-Ukraine relationship: the publication in the New York Times of the article by 5 foreign ministers of EU countries, named “Ukraine’s Slide”. This article is in some way a highly alarming signal of Ukraine’s slide towards authoritarianism and deviation from European democratic values, which will lead to the failure of Ukraine’s Euro-integration policy. Such threats can have far-reaching consequences not only for Ukraine itself: discrediting the foreign policy course of the president V. Yanukovych, and the loss of Ukraine’s state sovereignty, but also for all of Europe. The reason for this is that Ukraine’s geopolitical weight can cause a tectonic displacement of the entire geopolitical European landscape.

This warning seems to be sincere as the Ukraine’s EU membership prospects have been supported by all the countries, which have penned this article, with the exception of Germany. Poland, the Czech Republic, Sweden as well as Great Britain were the most consistent supporters of Ukraine’s European prospects. In actuality, this means that we are losing the remaining closest allies in the EU. Without their support it will be impossible to hope for the ratification of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine.

Apart from the above-mentioned publication by the ministers of EU’s leading countries, attention has been drawn to another two articles which have recently appeared in the press, expressing the same uneasiness regarding Ukraine. In effect, the authors of these publications are also historical supporters of Ukraine’s Euro-integration policy: the ex-director of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Winfried Schneider-Deters and the ex-Ambassador of the USA to Ukraine, Steven Pifer.

It is worthwhile noting that they do not touch upon political demands concerning Yulia Tymoshenko’s conviction, but rather conceptual issues which block Ukraine’s advancement to the EU.

Focusing the EU’s demands on freeing Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko from jail and allowing their participation in parliamentary elections does not actually solve this problem in principle. Even if official Kyiv will make unprecedented concessions to Brussels and allow Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko *to participate* in parliamentary elections, the situation will not change. In their cases their imprisonment is the result of political processes in Ukraine and not their reason. Hence, after the parliamentary elections, even with the participation of the imprisoned oppositionists the problem will still remain and Ukraine will be again left without the Association Agreement.

Schneider-Deters points out that «the Association Agreement might be the last real chance for Ukraine to become, in time, a member of the European Union. If this opportunity is lost and president Viktor Yanukovych takes such a risk because of the Yulia Tymoshenko’s case, Ukraine will “reunite” with Russia in any whatever form in the nearest future”.

However, this problem is far more serious than the cases of Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko. It sits on the fallibility of Ukraine’s model of Euro-integration, which is being implemented by the present authorities today. The fallibility of this model lies in two conceptual matters, at a minimum: the concept of double asymmetric integration and the authoritarian model of Ukraine’s modernization.

The concept of double asymmetric integration or the concept of equal proximity envisages integration of Ukraine simultaneously into two different directions: economic and humanitarian integration with Russia known as the intellectual cultural “Russian world” notion, combined with the integration in the economic and political area of the EU. In combining these two different directions of

integration, Yuriy Miroshnychenko, the representative of the president Yanukovych in the Parliament has said: “Russia has the status of our strategic partner. That is why such integration with the EU does not endanger the relationship with Russian Federation, we hope for the support of our European course by the Russian Federation”. Such a thesis obviously flows out of the concept of common interests of historical fate between Ukraine and Russia. Following this logic it appears that things which are advantageous for Ukraine must be advantageous for Russia as well. However, Russia is building its own integration project, and under these conditions such logic does not work. Moreover, the intention of Ukraine to integrate with the EU poses a direct threat to the Russian project, and this has been repeatedly declared by the leaders of the Kremlin. Hence, it is clear that during his third term as president, V. Putin will do his best to put an end to all of Ukraine’s intentions to integrate with the EU and return it to Russia’s own reintegration projects.

Meanwhile, EU integration requires economic reforms. Consequently, two paths for this have come before V. Yanukovych. The first is to carry out radical economical reforms. The second is to preserve the status quo, freeze the situation during the period of his presidency. Painful and unpopular reforms do not promote stability and the authority of those in power. Clearly, this was the reason for carrying out modernization based on an authoritarian political basis. The hope that it would be possible to integrate with Europe on this basis, considering Ukraine’s geopolitical weight turned out to be exaggerated. Steven Pifer points out: « what it means is that Ukraine should be more significant for Europe than for Europe to be of a concern for Ukraine. In reality in EU circles, taking into consideration the policy of Kyiv, Ukraine is increasingly considered to be an irritant, rather than an asset».

Despite the enormous efforts of Ukrainian diplomacy, ***the endeavor to put into practice the Euro-integration course by means of a pragmatic policy, avoiding conceptual value-based issues, has reached its limit.*** The maximum that is practicable to achieve is to initial the Association Agreement, which will possibly take place on December 30, 2012.

Hence, it is high time to reevaluate the conception of Euro-integration.

# UKRAINE – NATO

## *Key theme analysis: The Summary of the sitting of the Ukraine-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council and the plans for cooperation in 2012.*

While putting into practice a pragmatic policy, Ukraine constantly underlines that a non-bloc status will be maintained, but on the other hand proclaims that it is not possible to keep aside of cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area, and, in particular, in the process of developing and creating a new system of collective security and defense in Europe. So, western politicians are beyond being surprised at such a “contradiction”, rather taking it as the official course of the Ukrainian authorities. This particularly concerns cooperation with NATO, which has acquired a “pragmatic” coloring. The same typical situation was observed during the **sitting of the Ukraine-NATO on March 14, 2012**. Its agenda was focused on the two key issues: assessment of the Annual National Program of cooperation Ukraine – NATO (ANP) for the year 2011 and the review of the ANP – 2012 as well as “the political landscape” in Ukraine before holding the parliamentary elections.

On the Ukrainian part, there were points made to the effect that the annual national programs and action plans can be viewed, without exaggeration, as concrete “road-maps” for the development of a democratic society and state in Ukraine. For this reason the ANP remains essentially the only systemic policy document of internal reforms in the state.

Despite the objectivity of such opinions, in *analyzing the assessment* of the ANP by NATO representatives, it can be said that the spirit of this program is far from being embodied. Consequently, despite the certain positive in implementing the ANP in 2011, particular spheres have caused concern. The member countries of the Alliance are seriously concerned about the domestic situation in Ukraine: abandoning freedom of speech, criminal prosecution of opposition leaders, particularly contrasted with the achievements of the Orange Revolution, which have to be by all means preserved, first and foremost for the sake of Ukrainian society.

The assessment of the results of the ANP – 2011 is represented in the resulting document of the sitting – Declaration of the Ukraine-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council, in which it is positively ascertained that 93% of the Program has been implemented, but the very program has a number of drawbacks: it was approved considerably late, the overwhelming majority of the document arrangements were implemented within the last month – month and a half of its force; the targets mainly are oriented not to ensuring qualitative changes, but to quantitative parameters, not to promoting reforms but to achieving statistical indices. The particular concern, in the opinion of the session participants, is caused by the problems connected with assertion of respect for the rule of law and human rights, prevention of corruption, development of civil society, the low level of erudition of Ukrainians about the modern essence of NATO and Ukraine’s cooperation with it. The process of development the ANP – 2012 does not look very optimistic too. Its draft is still being considered by the Government. The absence of effective institutional mechanism of coordination and monitoring the realization of annual national programs, as well as constructive partnership Ukraine – NATO in general, considerably prevents the ANP from achieving a high-quality result.

Taking into consideration that the reformatory potential of the ANP is far from being used to the fullest extent, the Inter-parliamentary Council has defined appropriate recommendations and addressed them to the concerned authorities on the part of Ukraine, as well as on the part of NATO. In particular, the Inter-parliamentary Council, having recognized as extremely important to preserve the effective infrastructure of Ukraine – NATO cooperation, urged the governments of Ukraine, members countries of NATO and the Alliance itself to improve the ANP as the key document of bilateral relations and to make it become an efficient tool of systematic reforms in Ukraine, reinforcing on its territory the fundamental general democratic values which form the basis of NATO.

Special attention should be paid to the public information dimension of Ukraine – NATO cooperation; in particular, establishing a new state public information program in this sphere. At the same time, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine should improve the practice of parliamentary control of the ANP's implementation, by means of expanding measures on the parliament-wide level, deepening of cooperation of the executive branch with civil society; and for the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO to ensure the ensure an annual review of the course and results of ANP at the sessions of the Assembly or its government bodies.

Along with the disappointing assessment of ANP instrument box, *concern was also expressed as to the punishment of the ex-prime minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko and ex-minister of internal affairs of Ukraine Yuriy Lutsenko*, who “are losing their health in prison, and it looks like the Ukrainian side is not producing any adequate reaction to this”. Consequently, the relations of the Alliance with partners concern not only military matters and security but also are oriented on values which partners themselves support and in this respect the assessment of the ANP-2011 causes concern as to the fact that “the progress in some spheres will reverse”.

As a result, it is pointless to hope that the ANP will become an efficient instrument provided by the Alliance to carry forward wide-ranging internal reforms in Ukraine for the sake of achieving common standards, the sphere of security and defense included. It is necessary to build a new course of cooperation, on the bases of which Ukraine could successfully take on its obligations.

# FOREIGN POLICY OF UKRAINE

Key theme analysis: ***What consequences will the third presidential term of V. Putin have on Ukraine?***

On May 4, 2012 the presidential elections in Russia took place, which were won by Vladimir Putin. Although the elections were held in Russia, Ukraine with bated breath was expecting its results, regardless of the fact that they were absolutely predicted. No one was surprised to see the old president V. Putin become the new president. Having lost the elections the Russian opposition began to speak about falsifications, which immediately harkened back to the “orange revolution” and a possible scenario in Russia. However, it is unlikely for such an event to take place in the Russian Federation. Firstly, the influence of the government on the events in the country is far too strong. Secondly, even if we imagine the utopian situation of absolute absence of falsifications, Putin still would win these elections for two reasons: the lack of alternatives and subconscious wish of Russian citizens to live in an imperial country. In his election campaign V. Putin once again put emphasis on the re-establishment of the mighty strong Russian empire. And this candidate was the only candidate who could actually keep this promise. Characterizing Putin as a politician, it is noteworthy that he at least partially acts in the interests of Russia and Russian citizens. This is the reason why he is supported by the people.

The question which Ukraine is worried about in the first place: **what will be the further relations between our countries?** What will be the behavior of the old new President? There are two variants of these relations, and unfortunately none of them is positive for Ukraine.

**The first variant:** preserving the status quo, as, in fact, the country's ruling political forces have not changed. V. Putin had also a strong influence on foreign policy of the country during his term in office as the Prime Minister. There is a belief that Medvedev was just a marionette, who actually fulfilled the orders of his Leader. **The second variant** is much worse and unfortunately more likely: the President will conduct a more aggressive and strict policy regarding Ukraine. *Firstly*, now is the most favorable moment for Putin to draw Ukraine into the sphere of his absolute influence. The Process of Euro-integration for Ukraine has ceased and been postponed for an unlimited period. Europe clearly indicated that without solving the problem of Tymoshenko and Lutsenko, it would not support the initiative of Ukraine of becoming part of the EU. In this way, day after day, Europe is pushing Ukraine away more and more, thus bringing it nearer and nearer to Russia, the Customs Union and all the “benefits” which Ukraine can obtain from the Russia. This is a unique chance for the Kremlin, which Putin will definitely take.

In this situation **it is worthless to expect that any will achieve any compromise in the main gas issue.** And despite all the declarations that a new gas contract will be made, it is possible to predict that it will not be favorable for Ukraine. *Firstly*, Moscow will make concessions only if it benefits from something else, for example, if Ukraine enters the Customs Union. *Secondly*, even if the contract is signed on the terms, more or less favorable for Ukraine, it will be done only for the sake of not arising in Ukraine the question as to the diversification of the sources of supply. *Thirdly*, since the negotiations between “Naftogas” and “Gasprom” have reached a deadlock, further developments will take place on the Presidents' level. And in this aspect the subjective factor comes to play: the complicated interpersonal relations between Putin and Yanukovich.



The Gas Issue is the main method of management and pressure on the part of Russia on Ukraine. That is why Ukraine is likely to make concessions once again. The new gas contract will be signed, but it will draw Kyiv even further into the dependence on the Russian Federation. Putin has an incredible desire to get complete control over the Ukrainian Gas-Transport System, and because of this the active resistance of Ukraine irritates him. Consequently, the negotiations have reached the condition where instead of diplomatic methods of policy and negotiations, threats and other methods of blackmail are used.

Another important factor which will have impact on our countries' future relations is the Eurasian summit. There Ukraine, through the President of Ukraine Yanukovich, will receive instructions as to the further actions of Ukraine as a country. And unfortunately Ukraine does not have clear and strong key factors of influence on the situation; moreover, after signing the Kharkiv agreements it also lost the key factors of resistance of the Russian Federation's control.

The present vector of future desirable concessions to Russia has been traced. Now, they concern not only the political sphere or the sphere of national security, but also the very intellectual basis of the existence of Ukrainian nation – the intentions to make Russian a state language in Ukraine. Proceeding from the fact that the state status of language is a symbol of nationhood, this, in fact, means thrusting Russian nationhood on Ukraine, which Russia so ardently strives for.

***The Realization of such intentions together with incompetence, corruption, turning the attention of the authorities exceptionally to personal benefits, inept management and a great number of other drawbacks will lead to the intensification of surrendering national sovereignty.***

