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UKRAINE – THE EUROPEAN UNION



KEY THEME ANALYSIS

IMMATURITY OF THE EU'S FOREIGN POLICY CALLS INTO QUESTION THE FUTURE OF BOTH UKRAINE AND THE EU ITSELF

Active discussions of the Ukrainian issue at the 50th Munich Security Conference (January 31 – February 2, 2014), a meeting of the European Parliament (February 6), and the European Council meeting (February 10) did not bring any real results and indicated **the incompatibility of the existing European bureaucratic mechanisms with modern challenges**. The European leaders continued talking about Ukraine's right to freely choose its course, criticized Russia for pressure, and promised Kyiv potential financial assistance sometime in future. Let's remind ourselves that EU leaders had been talking about almost the same things before the Vilnius summit.

The European Parliament Resolution¹ and ***the Council Conclusions on Ukraine***² merely repeated the things which had already been being negotiated, not too successfully, by the Ukrainian opposition and the authorities during the last few weeks – the need to form a new government and to perform constitutional reform. The dubious 'value' of such EU 'advice' is especially evident at the background of the negotiations in Kyiv, which look like delaying time pending the completion of the Sochi Olympics. It should also be noted that while the European Parliament Resolution mentioned the possibility of sanctions, the Council Conclusions did not.

It seems that Brussels, as well as Kyiv, is expecting Vladimir Putin's steps – to respond to them. The Council has even promised in its Conclusions "to respond quickly to any deterioration on the ground". But the question is – why expect a deterioration which could be prevented? The Council's attempt to cheer up the Ukrainian supporters of the European integration by words that the Association Agreement "does not constitute the final goal in EU-Ukraine cooperation" – indicates that Brussels is still not fully aware of what is going on in Ukraine. It is not about European integration now; it is about the survival of Ukraine as an independent and sovereign state. The extent of the Russian secret services' 'not interfering' into Ukrainian affairs was clearly demonstrated by the fact that Russian officials were the first to 'find' on the Internet the record of the overheard telephone conversation between the

¹ European Parliament resolution of 6 February 2014 on the situation in Ukraine (2014/2547(RSP)). - <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-0098>.

² Council conclusions on Ukraine . – http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140960.pdf.

Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and Ambassador Jeffrey Payyet.

Victoria Nuland's resentment about the inertia of European diplomacy has probably indicated **the disappointment of Washington in the inability of the EU to defend its own interests, which prevents the U.S. from reducing its presence in Europe and focusing more on the Asia-Pacific region.** At the **Munich conference**, the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has said that "nowhere is the fight for a democratic, European future more important today than in Ukraine," and that the Ukrainian people have decided that "their futures do not have to lie with one country alone". Mr. Kerry was likely: 1) to show Russia that the U.S. was not going to betray Ukraine; 2) to indicate that Europe underestimated the potential geopolitical implications of losing the Ukraine.

Barack Obama's statements during the Internet video conference on February 1, 2014 also indicated that the United States had decided to conduct a more active policy towards the Ukrainian crisis – after two months of observing the EU's helpless efforts to oppose its resolutions to Russia's brutal pressure. **Barack Obama** said that protest in Ukraine had been caused by the decision to stop the European integration, and **expressed the hope that the "government with greater legitimacy" would be formed in Ukraine.** He also said that U.S. officials "are engaging on a daily basis with the Ukrainian government to make sure that we have a positive outcome there."³ On February 10, **the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Resolution "Supporting the democratic and European aspirations of the people of Ukraine, and their right to choose their own future free of intimidation and fear."** The Resolution warned the Ukrainian authorities of the possibility of "targeted sanctions".⁴

However, the promises of financial aid mentioned by Victoria Nuland on February 6 in Kyiv have not got more concrete shape – still no numbers, no terms, and no conditions. The same should be said about the appropriate EU promises. It seems that the leaders of the latter do not understand that it is much cheaper to help Ukraine now than to overcome later the aftermath of a possible collapse of the country of 46 million on the border of the EU.

Thus, **the situation around Ukraine indicates that the European Union has not become a geopolitical player, able to defend its values and interests.** The overly bureaucratic governing mechanisms of the EU, the inability to recognize and to articulate common pan-European interests, and to consistently resist external pressure – these things threaten the future of the united Europe much more than any economic crisis. **If the European Union fails to protect Ukraine, it will continue to lose allies (Moldova and Georgia will be the next), and finally will lose its internal unity.** The U.S. has already made clear its intention to leave European affairs to Europeans. **Europe was pampered by NATO's security umbrella, but it's time to grow up and to take responsibility for the fate of its own continent.**

³ Обама: Українці не хочуть, щоб на їх прагненнях поставили хрест. - <http://ukrainian.voanews.com/content/article/1842492.html>.

⁴ H.Res. 447: Supporting the democratic and European aspirations of the people of Ukraine, and their right to choose their own... - <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hres447/text>.

UKRAINE – NATO



KEY THEME ANALYSIS

BEING MIRED IN AFGHANISTAN, THE NATO IS LOSING ITS INFLUENCE IN EUROPE

The situation around Ukraine poses potential threats to the Alliance, but the latter stands aloof. That is in sharp contrast with that demonic role in the Ukrainian events, which Russian propaganda imputes on NATO. With the background of **the risk that an important partner of the Alliance – Ukraine would join not the friendly CSTO, or even break up because of civil conflict inspired externally**, the NATO Secretary General makes careful statements in his Twitter only when talks about the possible involvement of armed forces into the conflict in Ukraine arise.⁵

On February 10-12, during his visit to Kyiv, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Hugh Bayley called the use of force against peaceful demonstrators "totally unacceptable"; and urged the Ukrainians to choose "between the past and the future."⁶ But the problem is that brutal Russian pressure prevents Ukraine from making a free choice. And the world's most powerful military and political alliance is not able to protect its important partner (as NATO officials often call Ukraine) from external pressure.

The present situation clearly demonstrates that the partnership relations can't protect even such an important safety contributor as Ukraine. Ukrainian peacekeepers ensure peace and security around the world, including missions under NATO auspices. **However, when it came to threats to Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, it has to rely on its own. Such is the price of non-alignment.**

Events around Ukraine have also exposed the weakness of NATO, especially of its political dimension. It turned out that after a decade of talks about strengthening the non-military component, the Alliance still can't either predict the crisis nor forestall its aggravation. And the leading European NATO members, being as well the leading members of the EU, demonstrate an inability to protect their own political, economic and security interests from Russia.

Being mired in the Afghan campaign, the United States has not got control over Central Asia, but relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, and NATO has lost the initiative in Europe. Expansion to the East has been stopped, the missile defense system

⁵ Генсекретар НАТО: армія України має зберігати нейтралітет. - <http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/25249013.html>

⁶ У Верховній Раді відбулося засідання Міжпарламентської ради Україна-НАТО. - <http://rada.gov.ua/news/Novyny/Povidomlennya/87661.html>.

has not yet been built, and at the same time relations with Russia have not been improved, because the latter treats all concessions as a sign of weakness. In 2008 Russia 'took revenge' for Yugoslavia by occupying a part of Georgia, which had declared its intention to become a NATO member. In 2013 Russia regained its influence on Armenia, and its pressure has put Ukraine on the verge of a civil conflict. In late January 2014, the mass media informed that Russia had tested a new ground-launched cruise missile, and thus had violated the treaty of 1987 banning medium-range missiles.⁷

At the same time, the NATO failures in Europe have not been recouped by successes in Asia. Influence in Afghanistan seems to be lost soon after the withdrawal of the allied troops; and China increases its pressure on American allies, claiming rights to the disputed islands and territorial waters.

Trying to become a worldwide organization, NATO has reduced its attention to Europe, but the majority of its European members do not have enough motivation to care for the security outside the Euro-Atlantic. Brussels needs to rethink its approach to security in the region, for the protection of which the NATO had been created. And Ukraine will have to think seriously about the effectiveness of the non-alignment concept, under the conditions of an aggressive environment.

⁷ U.S. Says Russia Tested Missile, Despite Treaty. - http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/30/world/europe/us-says-russia-tested-missile-despite-treaty.html?_r=2.

FOREIGN POLICY OF UKRAINE



KEY THEME ANALYSIS

GLAZYEV ANNOUNCED THREE RUSSIAN SCENARIO FOR UKRAINE

Politicians and experts had expected some decisions from the Sochi meeting of Viktor Yanukovych and Vladimir Putin, held on February 7, under a veil of mystery. But no official information on the results of the meeting was published, except for the confirmation of the mere fact of that meeting.

However, just before the Sochi meeting, *the Russian president's adviser Sergei Glazyev proposed his vision of the possible scenarios in Ukraine*. Let us remember that it was Mr. Glazyev who had predicted the failure of the Association Agreement and DCFTA before the Vilnius summit; and his arguments were finally accepted by Ukrainian officials. Judging by Mr. Glazyev's interview with the 'Kommersant' newspaper, dated February 6, 2014⁸ we can conclude that Russia considers three possible options to address the Ukrainian crisis:

The first scenario. The violent crackdown of EuroMaidan after the refusal to fulfill the terms of the 'Amnesty law'. Sergei Glazyev told 'Kommersant' that the limit of concessions from the Ukrainian authorities had been exhausted already (*"the amnesty, proposed by Viktor Yanukovych, is the maximum that the government can do"*), and *"concerning the use of force – in situations when the authorities faces an attempt of the coup d'etat, it simply has no other options."*

Deputy Chairman of the Russian Parliament Vladimir Zhirinovskiy told the 'Russia 1' TV channel that the crackdown would take place after the Olympics: "He will dish it out to you after the Olympics. You will discover Yanukovych. Now he is sick just in case. And then he will declare: "Do not spare the ammunition!" And we will provide him with the ammunition. We will give him ammunition instead of money".⁹

The second scenario. The disintegration of Ukraine through 'federalization'. The Russian president's adviser has said that the federalization of Ukraine is *an "obvious necessity."* Herewith, Mr. Glazyev's vision of federalization implies granting the region the *"opportunity of partial foreign policy self-determination"*, noting that the eastern and southern regions are more inclined to Russia, while the western regions – to the EU. Thus, it is actually about provoking the

⁸ Сергей Глазьев: федерализация — уже не идея, а очевидная необходимость. - <http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/2400532>.

⁹ Жириновський: За кілька тижнів Янукович отримає від Росії набої та не буде їх шкодувати. - http://espreso.tv/new/2014/01/31/zhyrynovskyy_zh_kilka_tyzhniv_yanukovych_otrymaye_vid_rosiyi_naboyi_ta_ne_bude_yikh_shkoduvaty.

collapse of the state, when one half of Ukraine is joining the Customs Union, and the other half is joining the European Union.

The idea of the federalization of Ukraine has been actively promoted for several years by Viktor Medvedchuk, who is close to the Russian President, and recently this idea has gotten the support of the Communist Party of Ukraine and of some MPs from the Party of Regions. It is significant that the Head of the Donetsk Regional State Administration Andriy Shyshatsky does not support the idea of federalization, noting that "this could end badly, even to the loss of independence."¹⁰

The third scenario. "An active intervention of Russia". When answering the question about the possibility of the "active intervention of Russia", Sergei Glazyev said that the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 on Security Assurances to Ukraine *"requires to intervene in case of the conflicts of this kind."* Herewith, the Russian president's adviser *"sees no need"* to discuss the Ukrainian issue at the UN Security Council, because *"there are security guarantees, including Russia."*

Putin's former adviser Andrei Illarionov and well-known analyst Andreas Umland believe that Russian military intervention is possible, and the Kremlin may try to implement in Ukraine a 'Georgian scenario' – when the Russian 'peacekeepers' respond to the requests of the local authorities of some Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine 'to protect' them from the 'fascists and followers of Bandera'.¹¹ We should note that some Crimean deputies have already expressed their intention to appeal for Russia's 'protection'.¹² Thus, the scenario is already being worked on.

So, the Kremlin proposes three scenarios to Viktor Yanukovych, two of which are obviously unacceptable to him, because they destroy Ukrainian statehood and respectively – deprive him of his governance. Thus Moscow actually pushes Mr. Yanukovych towards allegedly the only possible 'force scenario'. Herewith, Mr. Glazyev in his interview admits that such a scenario might result in Western sanctions, including "the black lists, the arrest of all assets and accounts, and the confiscation of property." It is obvious that Russia might be satisfied with the scenario, where the Ukrainian President is restricted to travel abroad and has no other integration options, except for the Customs Union. In order 'to help' the Ukrainian authorities to make a choice, Moscow has resorted to economic pressure again: Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov has said that Ukraine would receive the second tranche of the promised credit (\$2 billion) only after payment for gas (Ukrainian debt is \$3.3 billion).¹³ In addition, the Russian customs officers have introduced a strict regime for the Ukrainian export.

However, Kyiv should remember that all the above scenarios present the Russian vision, based on Russian interests in the interpretation of Mr. Putin. ***Three months ago Mr. Glazyev was able to predict and to lobby the refusal of Ukraine to sign the Association Agreement and DCFTA, but neither he nor his partners in Ukraine were able to predict the impact of such a refusal.*** The country, which was steadily moving towards European integration just a few months ago, is on the verge of disaster now. The threat of war and of the collapse of the country seems to be too high a price for a discount on gas. Ukraine should have its own scenario, based on its national interests, and with no place for disintegration, isolation or intervention.

¹⁰ Федералізація загрожує Україні втратою незалежності – донецький губернатор. - <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/02/10/7013349>.

¹¹ Путіна можуть зупинити тільки США – екс-радник президента Росії. - <http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/25256774.html>; ЄС має запобігти "грузинському сценарію" в Україні. - http://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/yes-maye-zapobigti-gruzinskomu-scenariyu-v-ukrayini-_.html.

¹² Парламент Криму може попросити Росію "про захист". - <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/02/4/7012678>.

¹³ Украина в преддефолтном состоянии. - http://nvo.ng.ru/cis/2014-02-10/7_ukraina.html.